Staffordshire and Stoke on Trent Community Risk Register April 2025

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 requires emergency responders in England and Wales to co-operate in maintaining a public Community Risk Register. In Staffordshire and Stoke on Trent, this work is led by the Staffordshire Resilience Forum (SRF), which includes representatives from local emergency responders as well as public, private and voluntary organisations.

The Staffordshire Local Resilience Forum publishes the Staffordshire and Stoke on Trent Community Risk Register (SSOT CRR) on the Staffordshire Prepared website (www.StaffordshirePrepared.gov.uk). Its purpose is twofold:

- To direct contingency planning, emergency planning and business continuity management workstreams within Staffordshire and Stoke on Trent in order to ensure that time, money, and expertise is focused to provide the best capabilities possible in respect of the risks faced; and
- To provide assurance to the people and communities of Staffordshire and Stoke on Trent that a well-established, proactive risk assessment process operates here.

The SSOT CRR is reviewed by the SRF on a quarterly basis – or more often if required. The risks on it are identified through two routes:

- National risks i.e. those defined by the UK government (though some risks - such as coastal flooding - don't relate to Staffordshire or Stoke on Trent, and are therefore discounted from this register); or
- Risks determined locally, and which are considered by SRF partners to be worthy of inclusion in the register as no national risk covers the individual circumstances.

For ease of alignment, wherever possible, the SSOT CRR utilises the same risk information and score as the one used by Government in the National Risk Register (available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-risk-register-2025).

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
Terrorism							
1	International terrorist attack with strategic implications	NRR	Large-scale terrorist attack occurring overseas, involving a significant number of British Nationals (casualties and fatalities).	5	1	Low	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, there are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local response was required. Police would be the lead agency.
2	Northern Ireland related terrorism	NRR	Targeted terrorist attack in a public area in Northern Ireland. Attack could also pose a risk to public depending location. Could be fatalities and casualties, damage to nearby infrastructure and disruption to transport.	5	2	Moderate	
3	Terrorist attacks in publicly accessible locations	NRR	Scenarios include: • Detonation of an improvised explosive device (on person, vehicle or emplaced) at enclosed/unenclosed location with high crowd densities - resulting in multiple fatalities and casualties and there may be further fatalities and casualties through structural collapse (enclosed areas), fire/smoke or large numbers of people fleeing a scene to safety. • Marauding terrorist attacks include use of firearms or low-sophistication methods, e.g. bladed weapons, with the incidents taking place in a venue or public space. Potential impacts from both scenarios include fatalities and casualties, damage to property and infrastructure, increased demands on the emergency services, short-term excessive demands on hospitals and the wider health service in both the short and long term, disruption to essential services and economic damage. Other impacts include disruption to local and regional transport services, and disruption to education.	5	3	Severe	
4	Terrorist attacks on transport	NRR	For example, high or low sophistication terrorist attack on rail network or aircraft. Incident would result in a large number of fatalities and casualties. Aircraft attack resulting in crash over populated area would cause significant number of fatalities and casualties, plus long-term rebuilding and regeneration of the affected area.	4	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, there are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local

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							response was required. Police would be the lead agency.
5	Strategic hostage taking	NRR	For example, group of people being held hostage as part of a planned siege. Potential impacts include fatalities and casualties, damage to property and infrastructure, increased demands on the emergency services, disruption to essential services and economic damage. Public outrage at the perpetrator(s) would be significant and widespread.	2	2	Moderate	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, there are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local response was required. Police would be the lead agency.
6	Assassination of high-profile figure	NRR	Assassination of a high-profile public figure. There is also the potential for a small number of casualties in close proximity to the intended target.	5	2	Moderate	
7	Smaller-scale CBRN attacks	NRR	**Chemical scenarios include:** • Release of toxic chemical in enclosed / unenclosed environment resulting in potentially large numbers of casualties and fatalities. • Incidents which result in contamination of food or water supply, resulting in casualties and fatalities – these events could have an impact on consumer confidence and lead to adaptive purchasing behaviours. With all scenarios there is also the potential for significant economic damage. **Biological scenarios include:** • Dispersal of a biological agent in a smaller-scale targeted incident and at a larger-scale in an unenclosed urban area. There is the potential for large numbers of casualties and fatalities, and in the larger-scale event, long term catastrophic impacts on the environment and economy. **Radiological/nuclear scenarios include:** • Dissemination of radiological material into an unenclosed environment, with potential for large numbers of casualties and fatalities in a relatively localised event. In the case of a nuclear event, impacts would be catastrophic for the UK, with potential for widespread environmental damage and depending on the scale of the event, long-term exclusion of areas contaminated by radioactive material.	4	2	Moderate	
8	Medium-scale CBRN attacks	NRR		4	4	Critical	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, there are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local response was required. Police would be the lead agency.
9	Larger-scale CBRN attacks	NRR		3	5	Critical	Police would be the lead agency. Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, there are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local response was required. Police would be the lead organisation.

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10	Conventional attacks on infrastructure	NRR	Scenarios include terrorist attack on gas / electricity infrastructure resulting in significant loss of supply capacity to the UK. Domestic gas customers in the directly impacted Priority of gas supply would be given to domestic users (as they take longer to reconnect following disconnection for safety reasons). Within this process, some critical sites would be prioritised for supply. There would be casualties and fatalities from a lack of heating, access to necessary medical treatment, exacerbation of an existing condition or limited ability to use gas-fired cookers safely. Alternatively, a loss of electricity output at a site would result in an initial regional power cut. The network operator would reconfigure their network to stabilise the grid and reconnect most customers The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a physical attack on a critical part of the UK's fuel supply infrastructure. This would impact the production, importation and/or regional distribution of fuel as a result of physical damage or loss of operations, and the fuel sector would take time to adapt fully to the temporary or permanent loss of a critical asset.	3	4	Critical	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, there are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local response was required. Police
11	Cyber-attacks on infrastructure	NRR	Scenarios include malicious cyber-attack on: • a critical electricity system, leading to a total failure of the National Electricity Transmission System (NETS). All consumers without back-up generators would lose their mains electricity supply instantaneously and without warning. A nationwide loss of power would result in secondary impact across critical utilities networks (including mobile and internet telecommunications, water, sewage, fuel and gas). This would cause significant and widespread disruption to public services provisions, businesses and households, as well as loss of life. • a system critical to the UK's fuel distribution and supply. This could cause the temporary loss of fuel supply to a region. Replenishment of sites would take several days depending on the location.	4	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, there are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local response was required. Police would be the lead agency.

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			• on a system critical to gas transmission, causing a significant loss of gas supply. Domestic gas customers in the directly impacted region would lose their gas supply. There would be casualties and fatalities as a result of a lack of heating, lack of access to necessary medical treatment, exacerbation of an existing condition, or limited ability to safely use gas-fired cookers. However, impacts would depend on the scale of disruption. • a civil nuclear generating site resulting in a temporary loss of supply to the UK National Grid until its restoration or generating capacity could be increased elsewhere. • other elements of infrastructure such as transport (aviation, rail or road), and communication systems - varying consequences.				
Geographic & diplomatic							
12	Disruption to global oil trade routes	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario assumes that war, political upheaval or a more benign cause would significantly disrupt global oil supply, resulting in much higher global prices. This has a knock-on effect on the global economy, given its reliance on oil as an energy source (particularly for transport)	3	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.
Accidents & system failures							
13	Insolvency of supplier(s) of critical services to the public sector	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario of this risk is based on the insolvency of a supplier of critical IT services supporting operational systems or back office processes integral to critical national services across the country, such as emergency services communication systems, court services and customs/ immigration services and systems. Potential significant impact upon critical service operational delivery, such as lack of ability of emergency services to effectively operate, shutdown or slowdown of immigration systems resulting in reduction of UK border	3	2	Moderate	Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, all organisations classified as "Category 1" responders must have effective business continuity arrangements in place to support continued service delivery during a disruptive event.

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			capacity. Ongoing projects likely to incur delays and increased costs. Strategic and political consequences are likely, such as job losses and reputational impacts for the government. Impact dependent on the nature, size and geography of service and supplier.				
14	Insolvency affecting fuel supply	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario for this risk concerns an oil refinery, importation, storage or distribution company suddenly becoming insolvent. This could cause major regional disruption to the production and supply of refined fuels, impacting road transport, aviation and domestic heating fuel. The loss of fuel for heating would impact domestic customers, as well as commercial premises and care homes which are required to maintain consistent temperatures for residents. Impacts would be greatest during winter months.	4	1	Low	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.
15	Rail accident	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a serious rail accident that causes multiple casualties or fatalities, or significant environmental or economic damage. There would be damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, and potential evacuation of those affected. There may also be environmental damage or contamination. Impacts on the railway network would be widespread, with lines being temporarily closed for weeks due to the damage to the infrastructure. This would impact passenger journeys by causing delays, reduce accessibility to specific regions and affect supply chains.	2	2	Moderate	There are a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which responders would use if a local response was required. These cover command, control and communication as well as impact assessment and recovery.
16	Aviation collision	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario for the purposes of the assessment is based on an airborne collision involving a commercial airliner and a business jet over a major urban area as the aircraft is approaching the airport. This results in 100% fatalities of passengers and crew on board the aircraft, with further fatalities and casualties on the ground due to falling debris. Debris would also cause damage to buildings and road or rail transport in the affected area. This would require decontamination services to clean up aircraft fuel that is spread over a wide area. There would likely be closures to the airspace over	1	4	Moderate	

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			the UK and the airport until the cause of the collision is established.				
17	Disruption of space-based services	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario assumes that the collision of debris with a satellite produces a debris field that collides with and disrupts other satellites. This would cause a cascade of debris that impacts other satellites and creates further debris. A wide range of space-enabled services would be disrupted or disabled. The disruption to space operations would severely impact the space sector economy. Similarly, essential services such as financial market infrastructure, communications, government services, emergency services and transport infrastructure would be impacted due to their reliance on space sector technologies.	2	3	Moderate	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts, including Resilient Telecommunications arrangements.
18	Loss of Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a severe technical failure, due to either hardware failure or human error, in a Global Navigation Satellite System constellation leading to data corruption of that service. This would result in inaccurate position and timing data being delivered to users in space and around the world. The compound series of both technical failure and human error means the service would have no choice but to cease operations. There would be a significant disruption or complete cessation of transport (including aviation and maritime services), communications networks, financial services, energy and emergency services within a few hours of the incident taking place. There is also possible further disruption to other space-based services.	2	4	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts, including Resilient Telecommunications arrangements.
19	Simultaneous loss of all fixed and mobile forms of communication	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario assumes that transatlantic subsea fibre optic cables connecting the UK would be damaged over a number of hours, rendering them inoperable. The primary sector impacted would be communications. There would be considerable disruption to the internet, to essential services that rely upon offshore providers of data services (including financial services), and potentially to supply chain management and payment systems.	3	3	Severe	

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20a	Failure of the National Electricity Transmission System (NETS)	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on total failure of the NETS, which would cause a nationwide loss of power. All consumers without backup generators would lose their mains electricity supply instantaneously and without warning. A nationwide loss of power would result in secondary impacts across critical utilities networks (including mobile and internet telecommunications, water, sewage, fuel and gas). This would cause significant and widespread disruption to public services provisions, businesses and households, as well as loss of life. Reasons for failure could include an extreme weather event, a cyber-attack and cascading technical failures.	3	5	Critical	Such an incident would be at a scale most likely requiring response to be coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts. These include Resilient Telecommunications arrangements and plans for responding to large-scale power outages.
20b	Regional failure of the electricity network	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a significant failure of the electricity network across several regions of Great Britain leading to the loss of power across the affected regions. Impacts would vary depending on which regions are affected and the scale of the disruption. This would result in some failures across utilities, causing disruption to public services as well as domestic households and businesses. It is expected that telecommunications systems and transport services (rail, road and aviation) would be disrupted due to the failure of electronic systems.	3	3	Severe	Such an incident would be at a scale most likely requiring response to be coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts. These include Resilient Telecommunications arrangements and plans for responding to large-scale power outages.
21	Failure of gas supply infrastructure	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a technical failure or accident causing a significant loss of UK gas supplies in winter. Domestic gas customers in the region would not lose their gas supply. If the loss of supply led to a gas shortfall, emergency procedures could be required to safely balance and maintain pressure on the network by stopping supply to large industrial users, including a proportion of gas-fired power stations (as the largest users). Disconnecting gas supply to electricity generator stations could cause a shortfall in electricity supply. The scale of disruption to power supplies will depend on electricity demand and availability of wind and nuclear generation. In the event of a prolonged electricity supply shortfall, rolling power cuts lasting 3 hours a time	3	4	Critical	Such an incident would be at a scale most likely requiring response to be coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.

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			may be required to balance supply and demand. Within this process, critical sites would be protected from disruption, with the remaining disconnections being evenly distributed across Great Britain. Further information on established emergency procedures for a gas or electricity emergency can be found in the National Emergency Plan for Downstream Gas and Electricity. Large industrial users of gas would lose their gas supply first, within this process, some critical sites would be prioritised for supply to ensure essential services continue for as long as possible. Domestic customers outside of the impacted region would be prioritised for gas supply above all industrial customers (including priority customers). This is because domestic customers take significantly longer to reconnect following disconnection for safety reasons. In the region without gas, there would be casualties and fatalities from a lack of heating, access to necessary medical treatment, exacerbation of an existing condition, or limited ability to use gas-fired cookers safely. The Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero would initiate the Electricity Supply Emergency Code (ESEC) as demand disconnections would continue for more than 48 hours. This would enable the National Energy System Operator (NESO) to publish rotas up to 7 days in advance, enabling households and businesses to better prepare for power outages and mitigate disruption.				
22	Civil nuclear accident	NRR	This scenario is based on an accident occurring at a UK civil nuclear site that results in a release of radiological material that extends beyond the boundary of the site. Onsite casualties could require decontamination, monitoring and treatment. No immediate fatal health effects would be anticipated offsite but there could be offsite casualties suffering from the effects of radiation. There could also be an increase in the risk of longer-term health impacts, such as cancers. The resulting contamination could affect the environment and food production, and there could be disruption to domestic and international transport. The overall impacts of a release are highly dependent on weather patterns.	1	5	Severe	Such an incident would be at a scale most likely requiring response to be coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.

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23	Radiation release from overseas nuclear site	NRR	In line with good practice the UK plans for a range of scenarios, including less likely, more severe scenarios that are beyond reasonable worst-case. This scenario is extremely unlikely. It is based on an accident occurring at an overseas nuclear site, close to the UK. This could affect the UK and its interests overseas, with overall impacts being highly dependent on weather patterns and distance from the UK. There would likely be no acute radiation-linked immediate health effects for people in the UK although, depending on the weather patterns, there could be an increased risk of cancer over the longer term if the release occurred from an overseas site close to the UK. British nationals in the accident country would likely require consular assistance. The resulting contamination could affect the environment and food production, and there could be disruption to domestic and international transport into Europe (including Channel shipping lanes). This could impact the import of food from the accident country and surrounding countries. The overall impacts of a release are dependent on weather patterns.	1	5	Severe	Such an incident would be at a scale most likely requiring response to be coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.
24	Radiation exposure from transported, stolen or lost goods	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario covers radioactive goods that could be stolen, lost or transported by a legal owner without proper regard to radiation safety regulations. The sources would be mixed with non-contaminated waste in a scrapyard, or subsequently melted in a foundry and used to produce reinforcing bars, table pedestal castings, cast valve bodies or electric motor parts. The packaging used to transport the sources could also be contaminated with radiation. The amount of radioactivity involved would be small and the item disposed of safely. However, the risk would cause moderate economic damage and knock-on impacts beyond the timeframe for decontamination. The process of dismantling the radioactive unit would expose people to radiation and could cause contamination over a wide area, potentially leading to fatalities and casualties.	1	2	Low	The Fire and Rescue Service would lead on the response, supported by the UK Health Security Agency and other Partners working together in accordance with the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's multi-agency response and recovery arrangements.

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25a	Technological failure at a systemically important retail bank	NRR	Reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a sophisticated cyber-attack against a bank's internal IT systems, carried out by a state or criminal threat actor which take a bank's systems totally offline, with significant destruction and total disruption to systems, causing the unavailability of systems for at least 2 days, with a partial outage for 2 days thereafter. The most significant impact would be felt by vulnerable customers with only a single bank account. The bank will also likely face heightened fraud and operational losses. Consumers could ultimately lose confidence in the retail bank and bank runs could follow. In attempts to patch the vulnerability and mitigate the damage, state or criminal actors will almost certainly take advantage of delays to carry out malicious cyber activity such as further data exfiltration. This would increase the duration of the attack and disrupt recovery attempts.	3	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.
25b	Technological failure at a UK critical financial market infrastructure (FMI)	NRR	Reasonable worst-case scenario is based on sophisticated cyber-attack against a single FMI carried out by a hostile state or criminal actor. Significant destruction and total disruption to systems cause the unavailability of systems for at least a week, with a partial outage of a few weeks thereafter. The destructive nature of the attack causes hard drive data to be overwritten and infected with malware. Depending on the FMI impacted, there would likely be significant impacts on the processing of financial transactions. There is a risk that the UK will experience a loss of confidence in the availability and integrity of financial data as well as reduced confidence in the financial system. Secondary consequences include international and domestic legal implications concerning data. A malicious attack on an FMI that causes its protracted failure could threaten the financial stability of the UK or cause significant disruption to the wider UK economy and to consumers.	5	3	Severe	

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26	Accidental fire or explosion at an onshore major hazard (COMAH) site	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario for this risk concerns a major fire and/or explosion occurring at an onshore COMAH site, potentially causing building damage and possible collapse close to the site. The fire would generate a visible plume of smoke that may travel to nearby areas. The accident could result in casualties and fatalities. Other impacts include short-term local transport disruption and economic impacts in the order of hundreds of millions of pounds.	1	3	Moderate	There are multi-agency plans in place for such incidents which are reviewed and exercised regularly. In the first instance, response is likely to be led by Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service, supported by Directors of Public Health and other Staffordshire Resilience Forum partners - including the Integrated Care System (ICS) which has arrangements in place to deal with large numbers of casualties. Local Authorities would likely lead the recovery phase.
27	Accidental large toxic chemical release from an onshore major hazard (COMAH) site	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an accidental large release of toxic chemical gas from an onshore COMAH site. The release may involve one of a number of hazardous chemicals and would not necessarily result in a fire or explosion. The site would be located near an urban area and could result in fatalities and casualties. There would also be some long-term health impacts to casualties, with some vulnerable groups disproportionately affected.	1	3	Moderate	
28	Accidental work-related (laboratory) release of a hazardous pathogen	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on the accidental release of an infectious influenza-type pathogen from a UK laboratory. It is assumed that the pathogen would cause an infection that takes several days to emerge and spreads via close contact. This could result in fatalities and casualties requiring hospital treatment, along with cases that can be resolved without the need for hospital admission. The incident could last for several weeks until all contacts are traced and treated.	1	2	Low	The Directors of Public Health for Staffordshire and/or Stoke on Trent would likely lead the local multi-agency response, with support from UK Health Security Agency and other Staffordshire Resilience Forum partners in line with local multi-agency plans. With support from NHS partners, there are plans in place for the deployment of mass countermeasures if necessary.
29	Reservoir/dam collapse	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a sudden collapse of a reservoir without warning. This would result in flooding, with a substantial quantity of water moving at high speed. There would be casualties, fatalities and significant mental health impacts. Utilities (water, energy, communications) to nearby homes and businesses would be lost, with significant economic impacts resulting from property damage. Recovery operations would be hazardous among collapsed infrastructure and debris.	2	4	Severe	There are a number of multi-agency emergency response and recovery plans in place which responders would work to in the event of such an incident. The Staffordshire Resilience Forum also takes part in regular regionally-led flood exercises.

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30	Water infrastructure failure or loss of drinking water	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario would involve the sudden loss of piped water supply, or the degradation of the piped supply such that it was unfit for human consumption even after boiling. The loss of water would have knock-on consequences to the functioning of essential services such as schools, hospitals and prisons until alternative water supplies are provided or supply is restored.	2	1	Low	The water industry has robust emergency response plans in place for such a scenario. They would be supported by other partners from the Staffordshire Resilience Forum, in accordance with local multi-agency emergency response and recovery. From the outset, Staffordshire Resilience Forum partners would prioritise vulnerable people.
31	Food supply contamination	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an incident involving a pathogen in the food chain resulting in illness, hospitalisation and possible fatalities in a moderate to large number of people. There could be direct consumer health effects, however the public health impact of food incidents can vary widely. Additionally, the impacts of infection could be more severe in vulnerable groups such as young children, older adults and the immunocompromised. There could be food production/marketing implications, depending on the scale and sector affected (for example major shellfisheries, dairy, livestock production areas). Consumer confidence might also be affected, leading to lost markets and, where staple products are affected, adaptive purchasing behaviours.	4	3	Severe	The response to such an incident would depend on the nature and scale, however it will likely involve Local Authority Food Safety Teams supported by local and national partner organisations as needed. The response would be in alignment with the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's multi-agency emergency response and recovery arrangements.
32	Major fire	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on major fire, for example in a high-rise residential building, care home, assisted living complex or a hospital, that results in a significant loss of life or injury. There would be significant damage to the building/premises structure, with disruption to local transport services for up to a week. Disruption to essential services would also be expected, with significant pressure on local housing and accommodation due to rehousing requirements of residents.	2	2	Moderate	Response would be led by Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service, supported by the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements as required. These cover command and control, management of public communications, recovery, and site restoration. The local authority (LA) would be responsible for the provision of shelter and alternative residential

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							accommodation. Almost all of the residential tower blocks in Staffordshire are owned by private housing associations - Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service has worked in conjunction with LAs and housing associations to ensure the safety of residents in the wake of the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower in London.
Natural & environmental hazards							
33	Volcanic eruption	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an ash-rich volcanic eruption into UK airspace that results in sporadic and temporary severe disruption to flights in parts of UK or international airspace. Severe disruption could occur for up to 15 days (potentially non-consecutive), with moderate disruption over an additional 10 days during a 3-month eruption period. The duration of severe disruption would be heavily influenced by eruption characteristics, meteorological conditions, concentration of ash and level of aviation activity. Disruption could include severe flight delays, diversions and cancellations, impacting passenger and freight flow. The greatest risk to the UK from volcanic eruptions comes from Iceland. British nationals may be stranded abroad, while foreign nationals in the UK (including those diverted to the UK) may find themselves being forced to delay their return home.	4	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.

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34	Earthquake	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on earthquake activity in the UK that results in the ground shaking with an intensity up to 8 on the EMS, which causes damage to buildings and infrastructure. This could result in a small number of fatalities and casualties due to falling masonry or interior damage. Damage to buildings would range from moderate to severe, for example from extensive cracks in walls to complete collapse of chimneys. More substantial damage could occur to more vulnerable structures. Such an earthquake may cause short-term but significant disruption to infrastructure, transport and communications, even if the physical damage is comparatively minor. There is a low likelihood of power outages caused by vibration of apparatus at electrical substations. There is also a low likelihood of disruption to transport and communications networks. Safety inspections of high consequence structures and installations including nuclear power plants, dams and reservoirs, bridges and tunnels would be required.	1	1	Low	If there were significant impacts, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum could set up their multi-agency command and control arrangements to support local response and recovery. The local authorities would lead on the recovery (clean-up and restoration to normality).
35	Humanitarian crisis overseas - natural hazard event	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a major earthquake (magnitude 8.0+) occurring along the Sunda-Andaman fault zone in the Bay of Bengal. This would result in a tsunami that impacts Myanmar, Bangladesh, western India, and Sri Lanka, and cause casualties and fatalities among British and non-British nationals. The UK would also have a significant diaspora population from the affected regions. This scenario could lead to the destruction of housing along the Bangladesh coast, impacting a significant number of people including refugees. In Dhaka, Chittagong and Kolkata, there would be destruction to critical infrastructure, with casualties, and displacement also expected. In Western Myanmar, a tsunami would impact the conflict-affected Ayeyarwady and Rakhine states. In Northeast India, populations would be impacted by destruction to property and infrastructure. In Sri Lanka, the north-eastern coast would be hardest hit.	3	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.

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36	Disaster response in the Overseas Territories	NRR	One possible scenario is based on a hurricane occurring in one of the Caribbean OTs that exceeds local response capacity and requires significant short-term support (humanitarian aid and emergency services) and long-term UK response (relief and recovery). It is possible that a natural hazard may hit several Caribbean OTs at once, such as Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Impacts could include fatalities and casualties, damage to infrastructure and security consequences (law and order breaking down). There would also be a significant impact on the economy and wider society, as well as a risk to the UK Government's reputation during the recovery operation.	5	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.
37	Severe space weather	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario for this risk is based on a severe space weather event, approximately the same scale and magnitude as the Carrington Storm of 1859, lasting for 1-2 weeks. It includes a number of different solar phenomena including coronal mass ejections, solar flares, solar radiation storms and solar radio bursts. Each phenomenon would likely occur several times during a 2-week period, with each varying in magnitude, temporal and spatial extent. Impacts may include regional power disruptions, loss or disruption of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (for example Global Positioning System (GPS)) and some telecommunications (for example satellite communications and high frequency radio), disruption to aviation, an increase in background radiation doses at high altitudes and in space, and possible disruption to ground-based digital components. The catalogue of tracked objects in orbit would be significantly impacted, raising the risk of on-orbit collisions. There may also be second order impacts such as fatalities and casualties (for example, in the event of power disruptions).	4	4	Critical	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
38	Storms	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on storm force winds affecting multiple regions of the UK for at least 6 hours during a working day. Most inland, lowland areas would experience mean (average) wind speeds in excess of 55 mph, with gusts in excess of 85mph. Although the storm would be over in less than a day, disruption to infrastructure including power, communications, transport networks, homes and businesses could last for 1-4 days and for more than 5 days in remote rural locations. There would likely be some casualties and fatalities, mainly due to falling trees, structures or other debris. Some environment and economic impact would also be expected, due to fallen trees and disruption to transport networks.	4	3	Severe	The Staffordshire Resilience Forum have a number of multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which they would work to in the event of such an incident. These cover command and control, management of public communications, recovery, and site restoration. The local authority (LA) would be responsible for the provision of shelter and alternative residential accommodation; and would lead on recovery should it be required.
39	High temperatures and heatwaves	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an extended period of high temperatures and would affect 50-70% of the UK population. This would take place over 5 consecutive days, with maximum temperatures exceeding 35°C. Temperatures may approach or exceed 40°C in some places, with this most likely in parts of south-eastern, eastern, or central England. Such a spell of weather would cause significant health impacts to the general population, with excess deaths above the number experienced in a normal summer expected. Disruption to transport networks, supply chains, power supplies and water supplies would be expected. Social and economic disruption would be likely as everyday behaviours have to change, including working patterns and levels of productivity. Other hazards are very likely to occur concurrently with, or immediately after, the heatwave, including flooding from severe thunderstorms, poor air quality, drought, and wildfires.	3	4	Critical	There are a number of localised business continuity plans and multi-agency emergency plans and arrangements in place which Staffordshire Resilience Forum partners would work to in the event of low temperatures and snow. Additionally, the UK Health Security Agency has produced the Adverse Weather and Health Plan, which is reviewed annually and is designed to help protect individuals and communities from the health effects of adverse weather while also building community resilience. The plan sets out the actions which should be taken health and social care provides, and the general public, in the event of high temperatures and heatwaves. This is supported by the Met Office and UK Health Security hot weather health alert system

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
40	Low temperatures and snow	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on snow falling and lying over multiple regions of the UK and a substantial proportion of the UK population, including substantial areas of low-lying land (below 300m), for at least one week. After an initial fall of snow, there would be further snow fall on and off for at least 7 days, with brief periods of freezing rain also possible. Most lowland areas would experience some falls in excess of 10cm at a time, a depth of snow in excess of 30cm for a period of at least 7 consecutive days with daily mean temperature below minus 3°C. Overnight temperatures would fall below minus 10°C in many areas affected by snow. Such a spell of weather would affect vulnerable communities, particularly older people and those with pre-existing conditions (for example cardiovascular/ respiratory disease). An increase in falls, injuries (for example fractures), road accidents and hypothermia would also be expected. There would be excess deaths, above what is experienced in a normal winter, with a significant number of casualties and fatalities, placing significant pressure on health and social care services. Considerable impact to essential services, along with economic impact, would be likely due to disruption to transport networks, power or heating fuel supplies, telecommunications and water supplies. Schools and businesses would also be impacted by such disruption.	4	4	Critical	There are a number of localised business continuity plans and multi-agency emergency plans and well-tested arrangements in place which Staffordshire Resilience Forum partners would activate in the event of low temperatures and snow. Additionally, the UK Health Security Agency has produced the Adverse Weather and Health Plan, which is reviewed annually and is designed to help protect individuals and communities from the health effects of adverse weather while also building community resilience. The plan sets out the actions which should be taken by health and social care providers, and the general public, in the event of low temperatures. This is supported by the Met Office and UK Health Security cold weather health alert system.
41	Fluvial flooding	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a significant river flood event, resulting from cumulative local events or a series of concurrent events across multiple geographic regions following a sustained period of heavy rainfall. This could possibly be combined with snow melt and surface water flooding. Flood defences would become overtopped by river levels and breaches may occur in river banks and hard defences as they are put under pressure. Across urban and rural areas there would be flooding of homes and businesses. There will be casualties and fatalities. A large number of people would require evacuation, with a significant proportion of these being vulnerable and requiring assistance. There would be medium-term (days to weeks) loss of essential services	3	4	Critical	The Staffordshire Resilience Forum (SRF) have a number of well-rehearsed multi-agency response plans and arrangements in place which are activated in the event (or risk) of significant flooding. These includes command and control, public communications, localised flood plans, and evacuation and shelter arrangements. SRF partners regularly test and exercise flood response.

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
			(electricity and telecoms) to up to a substantial number of homes and businesses, with disruption to water supplies.				
42	Drought	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on large parts of South and East England facing severe drought conditions after 3 consecutive dry winters. Neighbouring areas of the Midlands and South West would face drought related impacts and there would need to be public water supply restrictions. There would be significant losses to the UK economy, with serious impacts on industry, agriculture and businesses. Severe environmental damage due to drought conditions would occur, along with an increased fire risk due to dry conditions. This would be combined with a reduced ability to fight fires due to water scarcity.	2	3	Moderate	The Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency response plans and arrangements in place for such a scenario. However, before a drought occurred, there would be a lead-in period during which hosepipe bans and other water-saving measures would be put in place.
43	Poor air quality	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a 30-day period of elevated ground level ozone or fine particulate matter. During a poor air quality event of this kind, the UK could experience significant health risks, including an increase in deaths from exacerbation of respiratory or cardiovascular conditions, with an associated increase in hospital referrals and pressure on emergency response services. The duration of an air quality episode would be heavily influenced by meteorological conditions. High ground-level ozone episodes in the UK occur most commonly in the summer months when high pressure weather systems dominate. Elevated ground-level ozone can also occur during springtime. At a national scale elevated fine particulate matter concentrations are most common in the spring. In urban centres however, high particulate matter events can occur at almost any time of year if emissions from road transport and domestic sources are released in certain weather conditions. These episodes may be worsened when already polluted air from continental Europe is drawn over the UK. Fine particulate pollution events may also arise from other natural phenomena including the wind suspension of soil dust following drought, from long-range transport (for example Saharan dust), and from uncontrolled biomass combustion from wildfires.	3	3	Severe	Local multi-agency response arrangements (including those for warning and informing the public) would be in line with existing plans, and likely triggered by notification from the UK Health Security Agency.

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
Human, animal and plant disease							
44	Pandemic	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an unmitigated respiratory pandemic with an unassumed transmission route and a high attack rate, with 4% of symptomatic infections requiring hospital care and a case fatality ratio of 2.5%. From start to finish the emergency stage of the pandemic in the UK will last at least 9 months and potentially significantly longer. Response mechanisms are likely to be required beyond 9 months to manage the chronic stage of the risk and longer-term recovery. The pandemic may come in single or multiple waves. The wave number depends on the characteristics of the disease, public behaviour, and government intervention. The pandemic may lead to behaviour changes in the population depending on the nature of the disease and the government's response. The scenario assumes 50% of the UK's population fall ill during the whole course of the pandemic, with about 1.34 million people estimated to require hospital treatment, possibly resulting in up to 840,000 deaths.	4	5	Critical	In accordance with the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's (SRF) multi-agency response plans for pandemics and infectious disease outbreaks, the Directors of Public Health for Staffordshire and / or Stoke on Trent would lead the multi-agency response. This would be supported by organisational business continuity arrangements and, if necessary, the SRF's excess deaths arrangements.
45	Outbreak of an emerging infectious disease	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a novel respiratory transmitted virus that emerges zoonotically (from animals to humans) in another country and causes a regional epidemic. This covers diverse virus families, which may acquire some degree of human-to-human transmission, such as influenza viruses, coronaviruses and nipah viruses. However, we must be prepared for a disease spread via any of the 5 main routes of transmission: respiratory, blood (including sexual contact), close contact oral (food and water) and by vectors such as mosquitos. There would be a small number of cases imported into the UK before border measures are applied, which could result in an outbreak of up to 2,000 cases with a case fatality rate of up to 25%. A significant number of contacts, up to 200,000, would need to be traced, isolated or monitored depending on exposure. Non-pharmaceutical interventions, rapid isolation and contact tracing activities would need to follow on from the initial border measures, with limited virus transmissibility	4	4	Critical	

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
			bringing the outbreak under control. Failure to contain the outbreak would result in a large epidemic in the UK, or a pandemic.				
46a	Animal disease - major outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario assumes that Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is introduced into a sheep-farming area. Infected animals that are not yet exhibiting clinical signs would be sold or moved to other premises before the disease is detected, resulting in multiple geographically dispersed outbreaks. The culling and disposal of approximately 1.9 million animals on over 2,900 premises could be required. This scenario is of much greater scale than the most recent FMD outbreak in 2007, but less than the 2001 outbreak due to improvements to livestock movement regimes and control policies.	2	4	Severe	In line with the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's Animal Health Plan, Staffordshire County Council (supported by the Animal and Plant Health Agency) would likely lead the multi-agency response to such an outbreak.
46b	Animal disease - major outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an outbreak of a highly virulent strain of HPAI that is unlikely to transmit easily to humans. Disease would be introduced into multiple large-scale poultry businesses, through direct or indirect contact with wild birds. Viral spread from both wild birds and between infected premises occurs, leading to an outbreak of 250 large commercial premises in a 6- to 8-month period. About 8 million poultry and captive birds would either be killed by the virus or culled for disease control, and there would be restrictions on trade and exports. Multiple mass-die-off events in wild-bird populations are likely.	3	3	Severe	In line with the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's Animal Health Plan, Staffordshire County Council (supported by the Animal and Plant Health Agency) would likely lead the multi-agency response to such an outbreak.

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
46c	Animal disease - major outbreak of African horse sickness	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario assumes that an African Horse Sickness (AHS) infected horse is imported into the UK and bitten by midges, which would carry the virus to other horses. Although the infected horse will probably die within a few days it would not be necessarily suspected by the owner and samples may not be submitted to the reference laboratory at The Pirbright Institute. By the time the virus is identified, it would be well established in geographically dispersed midge populations around the UK. Control measures include movement restrictions, culling of infected horses and may include preventive vaccination. The restriction zones for AHS are very large, up to 150km radius, because of the movement of infected midges. The outbreak would last for a minimum of 6 months (depending on the season and the presence of midges) and result in long-lasting trade restrictions, affecting the international movement of equine animals and a range of very high-value commodities. The likelihood and impacts of an outbreak of AHS continue to be assessed.	1	3	Moderate	In line with the Staffordshire Resilience Forum's Animal Health Plan, Staffordshire County Council (supported by the Animal and Plant Health Agency) would likely lead the multi-agency response to such an outbreak.
46d	Animal disease - major outbreak of African Swine Fever	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an incursion of an acute strain of African Swine Fever (ASF) into a feral pig population in England, which spreads before detection to domestic and commercial pig farms. Acute forms of ASF are highly pathogenic and have case fatality rates as high as 100%, but the virus remains stable in the environment for several weeks and in frozen products such as meat for many months. Feral pigs are only found in some areas of England, Scotland and Wales. The outbreak in kept pigs could last for about 16 weeks, with restrictions on exports remaining in place for a minimum of 9 months following the last confirmed infection. The outbreak in feral pigs could persist for up to 70 weeks. However, the scale of this scenario continues to be assessed.	3	3	Severe	

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
47a	Major outbreak of plant pest - Xylella fastidiosa	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an outbreak of Xylella in an area containing 3 to 5 plant nurseries, with evidence of possible spread on plants and plant products to multiple premises across the UK. While it is difficult to quantify the costs associated with Xylella impacting plant nurseries, there could be moderate economic costs relating to lost working hours, lost stock and restrictions on trade (estimated to be over £7.5 million for 5 nurseries over 5 years). The cost of government intervention, including surveillance, is estimated to be £5 million over 5 years. In the short term, measures to remove plant species may impact air quality (through the burning of material) and water quality (through the use of herbicides and insecticides).	5	1	Low	In the event of a major outbreak, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum would activate it's standard multi-agency response structures to provide support as required.
47b	Major outbreak of plant pest - Agrilus planipennis	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an outbreak in a mature, mixed woodland, which has remained undetected for 5 years. Initial surveillance would show that the beetle has spread beyond a 100x100m area, with the spread having occurred over multiple other sites. The beetle would have been present at these sites for 2 years. Damage could be partially reversed through the replanting of trees, although this is likely to have significant economic costs. The economic cost of the outbreaks could be over a billion pounds in environmental losses from impacts on air quality, biodiversity loss and carbon release (from burning).	4	2	Moderate	
Societal							
48	Public disorder	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on large-scale disorder that significantly impacts the emergency services and government. In this scenario there is criminal damage to public and private property, increased acquisitive crime, arson, rioting, looting and reduced community cohesion. Injuries would be expected to both members of the public and those involved in the emergency services response. There would be a risk of fatalities, with health services coming under increased pressure. There may also be reduced confidence in the police and government. It is assumed that there may be a number of specific trigger or flash points, which would	3	2	Moderate	Staffordshire Police have robust intelligence gathering and assessment processes to monitor community tensions and identify when disorder could occur. All police forces train to national standards, with processes in place to support mutual aid between forces. The wider Staffordshire Resilience Forum multi-agency response structures

CRR Ref Number	Risk	Source	Potential consequences	Likelihood	Impact	Rating	What's in place within our area to respond?
			lead to localised disorder across urban locations, simultaneously or sequentially.				would activate in support of local response as required.
49	Industrial action	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenarios for industrial action are based on action being taken by a significant number of staff and/or staff in critical roles taking action over a prolonged period. In disrupting an organisation's ability to function normally, industrial action can lead to temporary closures of sites, reductions in the availability of key services with impacts ranging from inconvenience and frustration to severe risk to welfare and safety. Services might continue, but at a reduced capacity during a strike period. The disruption could lead to economic consequences.	3	2	Moderate	All Staffordshire Resilience Forum (SRF) partners are required to have robust business continuity arrangements in place to protect service delivery in the event of a disruptive incident. Additionally, the SRF multi-agency response structure could be called upon if required.
50	Reception and integration of British Nationals arriving from overseas	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario assumes a large number of destitute or vulnerable British Nationals (BNs) and their dependents arriving from overseas following an emergency/crisis overseas. This is likely to occur within a 3 to 4 week period, requiring reception services and integration support. These BN arrivals may not be normally resident in the UK and do not have accommodation options of their own. There may be a small number of deaths and injured BNs because of the overseas emergency/crisis	4	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.
Conflict & instability							
51	Deliberate disruption of UK space systems and space-based services	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on an attack on UK or allied space-based systems or services by a hostile state or a proxy. The attack would aim to further their economic, political or military objectives, while attempting to reduce the risk of attribution. There would be immediate and longer-term impacts on UK space systems and services, resulting in severe disruption to essential services downstream. These could include food and water, and financial market infrastructure and communications (both voice and data services	3	4	Critical	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.

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52	Attack on a UK ally or partner outside NATO or a mutual security agreement requiring international assistance	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario for this risk involves an adversary state with a large, advanced military conducting a major air and land assault on a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security partner of the UK. The partner state suffers mass military and civilian casualties and a refugee crisis develops. Although the scenario is not UK based, there are likely to be British Nationals involved and humanitarian assistance will be required.	5	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.
53	Nuclear miscalculation not involving the UK or its allies	NRR	The reasonable worst-case scenario for this risk involves a limited nuclear conflict between two states that does not involve the UK. The impacts in the affected area would depend on factors such as the size of the yield of the weapon, location and the local population, particularly in terms of numbers of casualties and fatalities. There would likely be implications for UK businesses with direct or indirect ties to the affected region, given the potential for economic disruption. British Nationals in the region would require support. There would be the potential for high levels of migration from the affected region, increasing pressure on infrastructure. An increase in community tensions involving diaspora from the affected region who reside in the UK is possible.	5	3	Severe	Such an incident would be national in scale, with response coordinated by UK Government. However, the Staffordshire Resilience Forum has a number of multi-agency plans in place which could be activated to deal with local impacts.